Confidential Computing for LLMs — TrustedRouter
Run LLM inference behind hardware attestation across every provider. AWS Nitro Enclaves and GCP Confidential VMs, with remote attestation.
Run LLM inference behind hardware attestation — across every provider.
Confidential computing has been deployable since 2018. The industry just never put inference behind it. TrustedRouter does: the gateway runs inside AWS Nitro Enclaves and GCP Confidential VMs, and signs the exact binary it's running.
You challenge it with a nonce, get a JWT signed by the CPU's hardware root key, and match the image digest to the open-source build. That's confidential computing applied to the one data path that's becoming the most sensitive: your prompts.
NONCE=$(openssl rand -hex 16)
curl -s "https://api.trustedrouter.com/attestation?nonce=$NONCE" | jq .
# JWT signed by the hardware root key:
# eat_nonce your nonce (replay-protected)
# image_digest SHA-256 of the running container
# pcrs boot-time platform measurementsHardware root of trust.
Nitro Enclaves and GCP Confidential VMs isolate the gateway from the host. Even the cloud operator can't read what's inside.
No single-vendor dependency.
Attested on both AWS and GCP. A single vendor's compromise is detectable by divergence, not silent.
Verify before you trust.
The nonce-bound attestation endpoint lets any client confirm the running image on demand — not just at deploy, but per request.
The overhead is gone. The excuse is gone.
Nitro enclave overhead is single-digit milliseconds. GCP confidential VM overhead is the same. There's no longer a performance reason to run inference outside a TEE — only inertia.
TrustedRouter makes confidential inference a one-line base_url change, across 30+ providers, with the attestation exposed for you to check.
The full argument: “Attestation is All You Need”.
Attestation proves the running binary is the published binary on hardware you can challenge. It does not defeat a nation-state with physical access to the host, and it does not prove the open-source binary is bug-free. The trust anchor is the chip vendor's root key. Cross-cloud narrows that dependency; it does not remove it.